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Abstract
New emerging applications such as e-commerce and peer-
lo-peer systems require autonomous agents (0
dynamically determine trust in open environments. Trust
is a uustec's opinion towards a lruslee established lhrough
direct interactions or recommendations. Many research
efforts are on trust propagation via recommendations. We
investigate lhe trust production problem that determines
trust from a sequence of interactions (i.e. raled
interactions). This paper presents fOUf trust production
rules: "equal-weight-interaction" I "dilute-with-time",
"sIOW-lrust-quick-distrust". and "slow-trust-quick-
distrust-with-supervision". These rules can be
implemented by using an update or an analysis algorithm.
An update algorithm only maintains a trust state, which is
modified when a new interaction becomes available. An
analysis algorithm maintains the whole interaction
sequence and evaluates trust based on it. Four types of
user behaviours, "stable user", "repenting user", "cheater"
and "smarter cheater", are modelled. The proposed rules
are studied via simulation by using these models. The
results demonstrate that these rules make similar
judgments on a stable user who behaves consistently well
or badly. All rules except "equal-weight-interaction" are
able lo react to sharp changes in behaviours (a "repenting
user" or a "cheater") within 10 interactions. The "slow-
trust-quick-distrust-with-supervision" rule can even catch
a "smart cheater", who repeatedly misbehaves in short
periods and then tries to cover the bad effect by good
behaviours.
1. Introduction
New emerging applications such as e-commerce and peer-
to-peer systems require autonomous agents to
dynamically determine trust in open environments. Trust
is a truster's opinion towards a trustee established through
This reuarcll is Sllpporled by NSF gra/rIIlS-0209059. CISCO URP
and CERMS security celller.
direct interactions or recommendations. Evaluating trust
based on interactions between a trustee and truster (i.e.
first-hand information) is called trust production.
Determining trust according to recommendations from
third parties (i.e. second-hand infonnation) is called trust
propagation among trusters [9]. A trust model consists of
both trust production and propagation.
Although automatic trust production is critical for a
trust model, it draws fewer attentions than trust
propagation does. Most research efforts view interactions
as an element set. A statistical characteristic such as mean
or mode is used as trust values [1][4]. Trust production in
real life is a complex and subjective process. It has the
following properties.
• Time-dependent: It is more appropriated to thought
interactiOns as a sequence than a set. A trustee whose
interactions are {bad, good, good, good} may be
considered more trustworthy than the one with {good,
good, good, bad} although the numbers of "good" and
"bad" are the same. The reason is in the former case "bad"
occur long time ago while in the latter case "bad" just
occurs. This example shows that both the interactions and
their orders count in trust production. A trust production
rule is lime-dependent if it views interactions as a time
sequence.
• 11lterac,iOIl-depellde1lt: A bad interaction often has
much more effect on trust values than a good one does.
More efforn are needed to gain the same amount of trust
than to loose it. This is identified as easy-destruction-
hard-construction property. In order to satisfy this
property, we differentiate interactions that increase trust
from those that decrease trust and lIeat them differently.
A trust production rule works in this manner is called
interaction-dependent.
• Tmstee-dependent: A truster is more cautious to a
trustee who has done harm to her. It will be more difficult
for the trustee to achieve the same amount of trust than an
innocent one since her good behaviours are overlooked
while bad behaviours are taken seriously. A trust
production rule considering a lIustee's history to decide
the effect of an inleraction is called trustee-dependent.
• SubjectiviTy: Social science literature shows that trust
production is a subjective process. Two trusters may form
different opinion upon viewing the same interaction
sequence. Subjectivity is accommodated by providing
muhiply choice of trust production rule or tuneable
parameters for a rule.
We present four production rules and the corresponding
algorithms that have some or all of the above properties.
Four user models including stable user, repenting user,
cheater, and smart cheater are identified. The
performances of the production rules in terms of 3·
transition phase are investigated analytically and
experimentally under the models of repenting user and
cheater. Their capabilities of catching smarter cheaters are
studied via simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as the follows.
Section 2 introduces the related work. Trust production
rules are realized by using update and analysis algorithms,
which are presented in section 4. Four user behaviour
models are identified in section 5. We discuss the
theoretical analysis in section 6. Section 7 presents the
simulation results. The conclusion and future work is in
section 8.
2. Related work
The problem of establishing and maintaining trust without
predefined trusted third parties has drawn much interest.
One of the first works trying to formalize trust in
computer science is that of Marsh {3]. The model includes
the concepts widely adapted by other researchers, such as
situation or context, blind trust. Although il has strong
sociological foundation, the limitation of this model is
that it only considers a truster's own interactions. Rahman
and Hailes proposed a trust model that can be
implemented in P2P systems [1]. Trust is established via
truster's own interactions and recommendations from third
parties. Semantic distance that characterizes the difference
between previous recommendations from the provider and
interactions of the truster is used to predict the "true
meaning" of a recommendation. How to collect the
recommendations and how well the model will scale is
not clear. Yu and Singh proposed a model based on a
social network among entities [4, 5]. The main
contribution of this research effort is the approach that
systematically propagates recommendations via social
network. Aberer and Despotovic simplify the above
model and use it to manage trust in a P2P system. They
emphasize on the dala management and retrieval
problems for trust assessment.
None of above research efforts models the subjectivity
of trust thal is reflected as different trust anitudes and
heuristics of trusters. The methods for determining trust
based on own interactions do not capture certain unique
properties of trust fonnation (e.g. the effects of
interactions dilute with time and trust construction is
difficult after mistrust event occurs).
3. Trust production rules
In this section, we present the data structure used for trusl
production, three initialisation strategies, and four
production rules.
3.1 Data structure and initialisation
We assume that a truster gives a rating ranging from 0 to
I to each interaction. The higher the rate is, lhe more
trustworthy the interaction is. From the perspective of
trust production, two interactions are idenlical if their
rales are the same.
A trust production rule determines a trust state given
an interaction sequence. A trust state is a 2-tuple <tValue,
iNurn>, where tValue is a real number between 0 and 1.
The higher lhe tValue is, the more trustworthy the trustee
is. iNU11l is the number of interactions belween the truster
and the trustee. A trust state is associated with a specific
trustee and context. It must be initialised. There are three
initialisation strategies.
• Null illitiafi.wtioll: Both tValue and iNurn are set to O.
tValue is meaningless when iNurn is O. The trust state is
analogous to the null value in database.
• Static illitialisarioll: iNurn is set to 1. tValue is set to
a predefined value. The oplimistic, realistic or permissive
attitude of a truster can be implemented by using different
initial values.
• Dynamic illitialisarioll: iNurn is set to I. tValue is
dynamically evaluated each time initialisation is required.
There are three cases. (1) If the truster has interactions
with the trustee in other contexts, the mean or mode of
tValues in these contexts is used as the inilial value. (2) If
the truster has interactions with other trustees in the same
context, the mean or mode of tValues towards these
trustees in this context is used. (3) The mean or mode of
tValues of all trustees in all conte.... ts is used.
Compared with other strategies, dynamic initialisation
is more adaptive to lhe environment at the cost of higher
overhead.
3.2 Production rules
Based upon the dependencies on time, interaction, and
trustee, four production rules are proposed. They are
equal-weight-interaction (EWI), dilute-with-time (DWT),
slow-trust-quick-distrust (STQD), and slow-trust-quick-
distrust-with-supervision (STQD-S).
• EWl: All interactions contribute equally to the
determination of the trust value. Interactions are
considered as a set. A statistical characteristic such as
mean or mode is used as the trust value. Trust state is the
only infonnation stored in a trustee's profile. There is no
profile for a truster. This rule is independent of time,
interaction and trustee. It is not tuneable since no
parameter is used. EWI is the most simple but widely
used rule in literatures [l],[4}.
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• Dvn: Suppose lhe interaction sequence is <Ob lo
Obz,... Ob">. Obn is the most recent one, which
contributes to (I - a) portion of the trust value. The rest
a portion comes from the previous trust value that is
detennined in the same way. a is called dilution factor. It
is specified by a !:ruster and stored in her profile. This rule
is lime-dependent in the sense that the effect of an
interaction on trust value reduces with time. The
assumption of this rule is that the recent behaviour of a
trustee reflects its trust values bener than previous ones
do.
Truster
to the original values. Otherwise, her We and Wd will be
further decreased and increased respectively. The
supervision period associated with a trustee will increase
each time when she is put under supervision, so that she
will be punished longer next time conducting a foul event.
In this way, a trustee with worse history is treated harsher.
The parameters stored in a truster's profile include y, We'
Wd, PI, P2, and P3· "{ is the threshold for foul events. We
and Wd are initial construction and destruction factors. 't"
is the original supervision period. PI is the penalty ratio
used to decrease construction factor. P2 and P3 are the
penalty ratios used to increase destruction factor and
supervision period respectively. The current construction
factor Wo', destruction factor Wcl' and supervision period
't' are stored with trust state in a trustee's profile.
Figure 2 Data slructuce ror STQD
• STQD-S: Trust value is evaluated as in STQD until a
foul eve1/{ occurs. A foul event is an interaction whose
rating is lower than a threshold specified by a truster.
When a foul event occurs, the trustee is put under
supervision in the sense that her We is decreased and Wcl
is increased. If the trustee does not conduct any foul event
during the supervision period, her We and Wd are restored
Figure 0 Data structure ror DWT
Neilher of the rules discussed above is interaction-
dependent. The contribution of an interaction to the trust
value is not related to how good or bad lhe interaction is.
These rule do not have the easy-destruclion-hard-
construction property. Hence, two interaction-dependent
rules, STQD and STQD-S, are proposed. We define trust
destruction events for them. A trust destruction event is an
interaction that decreases the current trust value.
• STQD: Like DWT this rule determines trust value by
combining the rate of most recent interaction and previous
trust value. Unlike DWT that uses one dilution factor for
all interactions, STQD chooses one from a pair of factors
(i.e. COllSlnlctioll factor We and destruction factor Wd). If
the most recent interaction is a trust deslrUction event, Wd
is chosen. (I - Wd ) is the current dilution factor.
Otherwise, We instead of Wd is used. We and Wd are
specified by the truster and stored in her profile. They
satisfy the constraint We < Wd, which realizes easy-
destruction-hard-construction. In STQD, We and Wcl are
fixed and used for all trustees. It does not differentiate
interactions of a notorious user and one with good
reputation.







Tuneable V V V
Profile of truster V V V
Storage cost 2N 2N+1 2N+2 5N+7
Table 1 Summarization or lrust production rules
In this paper, trust value is represented by a real
number. Complicate representations, such as opinion and
fuzzy expression, are proposed [1],[4],[6],[12]. They can
be used directly by EWI and DWT because these rules do
not pose any constraint on trust representation. STQD and
STQD-S require that the domain of a trust representation
be totally ordered.
The production rules discussed in section 3 can be
realized by using trust update or trust analysis algorithms.
Figure 3 Data structure ror STQD·S
Table I summarizes the rules discussed in this section.
EWI is the most primitive rule while STQD-S is the most
flexible one. The last three rules can be tuning by
adjusting parameter. The rule used and the values of rule
parameters reflect the subjectivity of the truster. The
storage cost of STQD-S is higher than other rules. Here,
N denotes the number of trustees.





4.1 Trust update vs. Trust analysis realization
A trust update algorithm only maintains the current trust
state. Trust state TSn+! is conslructed by using TS~ and
interaction Obn+l' Trust update algorithm has the
following forms:
TS I =fl(Ob l)
TSi+1= f;(TS" Ob j+l) 2 s: i
where {fb ... f~ ... } is a family of functions. It is
impossible for an update algorithm to evaluate trust based
on a subsequence like "recent n interactions" since
interactions are not saved.
A trust analysis algorithm saves interaction sequence
and computes trust slntes based on them. An analysis
algorithm with an infinite memory model (i.e. all
interactions are stored) is more expressive than an update
algorithm. We can always derive the corresponding
analysis algorithm for a given lrust update algorithm [8].
In practice, analysis algorithms with a sliding window in
stead of infinite memory model are used. The window
size determines the maximum interactions that can be
kept. When the window is full, a new interaction will
replace the oldest one. In this case, trust state is computed
on the sequence starting from the second oldest
interaction. Trust analysis algorithm with window size n
has the following fOnTIs:
TS I , i = fi(Ob], Obi) for I s: i :5 n - I
TSk.~ = fn(Ob~, Obn-t-I:.l) 1 s: k
where {fj, ... f~J is a family of functions. fi has i
parameters, here I :5 i :5 n. TSk,nrepresents the lrust state
evaluated based on the interaction sequence of length n
starting from ObI:.
4.2 Realization using (rust update algorithms
The rules proposed in section 3 are realized by using lrust
update algorithms. Analysis algorithms can be devised
similarly.
EWI Algorilhm
TSlk.e) denotes the trust state of trustee k in context c. It
has two fields: iNurn and tValue.
I: Initialise TS{k,e).tValue based on the strategy
specified by the truster
2: if "null initialisation" strategy is used then
3: TS(I:.e).tValue = 0
4: TS(k,e).iNurn = 0
5: else
6: TS(k,e).iNuffi = I
7: end if
8: While there exists new interaction Ob
9: TS(k.e).iNum = TS(k,e).iNuffi + I
10: W = 1/ TS(k,e),iNum
11: TS(I:,e).tValue = TS(k,e).tValuex(I-W)+ObxW
12: end while
Initialisation is done by the first to the seventh lines.
Line 10 ensures each interaction has equal weight. Line
II evaluates trust value based on the new interaction and
the previous tValue.
DWT Algorithm
TS(k,c) denotes the trust state of lrustee k in context c. It
has two fields: iNurn and value.
Input: Dilution factor aE (0, I)
I: Inilialise TS(k,e) as EWI algorithm does.
2: while there are new interaction Ob
3: if TS(I:,e).iNum = 0 then
4: TS(k,e).tValue =Ob
5: Else
6: TS(I:,e).tValue = TS(k.e).tValuexu+Obx( I-a:)
7: end if
8: TS(l:.e).iNum = TS(k,e).iNum + 1
9: end while
Line 6 combines the new interaction and previous
tValue using u. Dilution factor in this DWT algorithm is
fixed. A potential improvement is to let
a=f(Timeol> -TimeD/> ). In this way, a is adjusted
o 0_1
based on the time interval between two consecutive
interactions.
STQD Algorithm
TS{I:.e) denotes the trust state of trustee k in context c. It
has two fields: iNurn and value.
Input: Construction factor We, destruction factor Wd
such that We < Wd.
I: Initialise TS(l:,e) as EWI algorithm does.
2: while there exists new interaction Ob
3: TS(I:.e),iNum = TS(k,e).iNum + 1





9: TS(k,e).tValue = TSCk.e).tVnluex(l-W)+ObxW
10: end while
Lines 4 to 8 determine whether the interaction is a
destruction event and choose the factor correspondently.
STQD-S algorithm
TS(k,e) denotes the lIuSt state of trustee k in context c. It
has six fields: iNum, value, We, Wd, period (i.e. 't'), rest.
The first five fields are discussed in section 4 and rest is
an auxiliary field.
Input: Foul event threshold y. Initial construction factor
We, destruction factor Wd such that We < Wd•
Initial supervision period 'to Penalty ratios Ph P2.
P3such that Ph P2E (0, 1) and P3>1.
1: Initialise iNurn and value as EWI does.
2: TS(k,c)'Wd = Wd
3: TS(k,e)'We=Wc
4: TSo<.e).period = 't
5: TSO<-c).rest - 0
4
w~ is defined similarly as w1 is. The function we use is
as follows.
Symmetrically, the decrease of construction factor we
must satisfy the following constraints:
I. !orallyll,O:;;: w~ and W~+I :;;:w~









By solving equation 4.2.2, we get:
w~ =P~ xwa
where, wa is the initial value of construction ratio.
.'. Equation 4.2.2 satisfies the above constraints.
4.3 Incremental trust analysis algorithms
For trust analysis algorithms, we are interested in finding
their incremental versions that avoid the computation
from the scratch by using the previous result and fixed
number of individual interactions. Such algorithms may
nol exist when sliding window memory model is used.
We prove the existence of incremental algorithms for
EWI and DWT. We assume that the window size is n in
the following discussion. The notation TSk,m is used to
represent the trust state constructed based on an
interaction sequence of length m starting from the k-th
interaction..
Lemma 4.3.1: An incremental trust analysis algorithm
exists for EWI rule.
Proof: If window is not full, TS1,i+' is computed by using
equation 4.3.1
TSI.,+l = (i>cTS1.,+Obi+l ) I (i +1) (i < n)
If window is full, TSk+1. n is computed by
following equation.
TSk+l. n= TSl<,n+(Obk+n- Obk) f n
Correctness of the algorithm:
Case 1: Equation 4.3.1 holds when an interaction is added
and the window is not full.
TS1,i+1 =( L~~;+IObj )/( i + 1) =
(ixTS Li +Ob,+1 )/0+1)
Case 2: Equation 4.3.1 holds when an interaction is added
and the window is full.
TSk+l." = (L~~::~Ob j )/1/= TS"." +(Ob"+n -Db" )/11
In this algorithm, the oldest and the most current
interactions are used. It agrees with the intuition that an
incremental algorithm undoes the effect of the oldest
interaction and appends that of the most current one.
Lemma 4.3.2: An incremental trust analysis algorithm
exists for DWT rule.
Proof: If window is not full, TSI.i+l is directly computed
according to the rule. If window is full, equation 4.3.3 is
used.
TSk+l • n=a x TSk• n+ (I - a) x Obk+n- exnx
Obk - ex" x Obk+1
w~ is the destruction factor when a trustee is put under
supervision n times without being released even once. The
first constraint ensures that w~ is monotonic increasing
with n. The upper bounded by 1. The second constraint
indicates that the destruction factor can be close to 1 to
any extent if n is large enough. The function we use is as
follows.
w1+I=w1 +PIX(I-w~) (4.2.1)
By solving equation 4.2.1, we get:
w~ =1-(I-wg)(I-PI)"
where, wg is the initial destruction factor.
:. Equation 4.2.1 satisfies the above constraints.
6: while there are new interaction Db
7: if Db::: rthen
8: TS(lc).Wd = TS(l<,c)'Wd + PI x (1 - TSll<.e)'Wd)
9: TS(l<,e}.We=P2X TS(k,c)'Wc
[0: TSll<.c).rest = TS(l<,e).rest + TS(l:,e).period
II : TS(l<,c).period = PJ XTS(k,c).period
12: end if
13: TS(k.c).iNum = TS(le).iNum + 1
14: if Db::: TS(k.e).tValue then
15: W = TS(I;.c),Wd
16: else
17: W = TS(k,e),We
18: end if
19: TS(l<,e).tValue = TSll<.e).tValuex(l-W)+ObxW
20: if trustee is under supervision and Ob > y then
21: TS(k,c).rest = TS(k.c).rest - I






The first to the fifth lines initialise a trustee's profile.
Line 7 determines if a foul event occurs. If so, the trustee
is put under supervision. As discussed in section 4, her
current construction factor is decreased and destruction
factor is increased (lines 8-9). Line 10 computes how long
she will stay under supervision. Line 11 increments the
supervision period that will be used when she conducts a
foul event next time. The thirteenth to the nineteenth lines
update tValue and iNurn as SQDT does. If a trustee is
under supervision and the new interaction is not a foul
event, her rest supervision period is reduced by one (lines
20-21). The construction factor and destruction factor are
restored when the supervision period ends (lines 22-25).
In STQD-S, the increase of destruction factor Wd needs to
satisfy the following constraints:
I. forall)'lI,w1:::;;lalldw~:;;:w1+1
2. lim w~ =1
H_
5
Figure 5 Behaviours of a repenting user
Figure 5 shows the ratings of interactions of a
repenting user whose mean function fmCt) is 0.2 for the
first 50 interactions. Then, fmCt) changes to 0.8.
• Cheater: A cheater behaves in the way opposite to a
repenting user. The behaviours of cheaters can be divided
into two phases: trust·building and trust-abusing. A user
behaves well in the trust-building phase to achieve a
trustworthy image. Then, he abuses the gained trust by






function of a stable user is defined as fmCn) = m, where
m is a constant. The ratings of interactions of a stable user
obey the same normal distribution. Figure 4 shows the
ratings of interactions of a stable user with fmCt):::O.8. The
fluctuation of ratings results from the unpredictable
factors that affect the user's behaviors.
• Repenting IIser. The behaviours of a repenting user
can be divided into two phases: misbehaving followed by
repenting. The characteristic of a repenting user is that her
trustworthiness is low in the first phase, but high
afterwards. This is demonstrated by a series of low rating
interactions followed by suddenly shift of interactions to









where no is the turning point.
Correctness of the algorithm:
By applying mathematic induction, it is easy to prove
that for any 1 =:;;: i. we have:
TS'.n =a"-'Obi +( l-a)X(L~~a"-iobl+J_I)
TSl:.n =a,,-JObJ:. +(l-a)x(L~~;an-jObk+j_l) }
TSk+l,T1 =a"-·Obl:+l +(l-a)X(Li~ia"-jobk+j) =>
TSk+I.,,= IX X TSk. II + (I - a) x Obk+,,- (XliX O~ - ri' X
Obk+1
In this algorithm, two oldest and the most recenl







5. User behaviour models
In order to study the proposed trust production rules,
interaction sequences representing different user
behaviours need to be generated. A user's behaviour is
determined by her lruslworthiness as well as some
unpredictable factors. We model a user's behaviours
using random variables with normal distribution. Two
characteristic functions <fmCn), f.Cn» are used. The mean
function fmCn) determines the mean value of the normal
distribution at interaction n. It ranges over [0, 1] and
characterizes the effect of trustworthiness. The variance
function f.Cn) determines the variance of the normal
distribution at interaction n. It characterizes the effect of
unpredictable factors. The raling of the interaction n is
generated from the nonnal distribution with mean fmCn)
and variance fln).
Four typical user behaviour models are identified.
They are called "stable user", "repenting user", "cheater"
and "smart cheater". Because we are interested in the
trustworthiness of a user Cthe mean function fmCn», in the
following discussion, we let flt) be a constant 0.51 such
that ratings of interactions fall into [fmCn) - 0.1, fmCn) +
0.1] with probability of95%.
• Stable user: A stable user is the one whose
trustworthiness does not change over time. The mean
0.'..,
'. '00
Figure 4 Behaviours of a stable user
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0 ~ '00 ,~
Figure 6 Behaviours of a cheater
whose characteristic function fm(t) is 0.8 for the flfst 50
interactions and 0.2 afterwards.
• Smarr cheater: A smart user does bad things.
However, instead of misbehaving continuously, he tempts
cover the bad effects by intentionally doing somelhing
good after misbehaviours. He repeats the process of lrust-
building and trust-abusing. For a smart cheater. fm{l} is a
periodic function. For simplicity, we assume the period is
N, the mean function is defined as:
{
m hiKh (II mod N) < 110fm(lI) =
m10w othenvise
Figure 7 shows the ratings of interactions of a smart
cheater whose period is 20. In the first 15 interactions of
each period, fm(t) is 0.8. For last 5 interactions, fm(t)
drops to 0.2.
We investigate the above four user behaviour models
in this paper. Other models can be defined and analyzed










•0 ~ '00 ,~
nlonclkn'l
Figure 7 Behaviours of a smart cheater
6. Theoretical analysis
For a production rule, we denote Til: by the trust value
evaluated based on the first k interactions. T Ii: is a random
variable, whose expectation E[TkJ summaries the value
the rule may produce based on the k interactions.
For stable users, we are interested in whether the trust
values evaluated by a trust production rule nre also stable.
For repenting users and cheaters, we would like to
investigate how fast a rule responds to the sharp changes
of the behaviours. In this section, we analytically
investigate these issues by studying E[TJ for the rules
proposed in section 3.
6.1 Stable user
Definitioll 6././: A trust production rule cOllverges for a
stable user if lim E(TI;) exists. lim E(TI;) is called
k_ I;~t-
theoretical trust for a stable user.
Lemma 6.1./: EWI rule converges for any stable user. The
theoretical trust value is M. which is the mean of ratings
of interactions.
L:~_IObi .
Prove: TI; - ::::) E(TI;) =M::;) hm E(TI;) =M
k I;~_
Lemma 6./.2: DWT rule converges for any stable user.
The theoretical trust value is M, the mean of ratings of
interactions.
Prove: Let a be the dilution factor.
Tt = ak-10bJ +(I-afL:;;a
iObk._1 =>
E(Tt)=at-1M +(I-a)L~do/M=> E(Tk ) =M
.'. lim E(Tt)=M,-
6.2 Repenting user
Definition 6.2.1: A trust production rule with parameter
set P converges for a repenting user if lim E(TI;) exists.,-
lim E(TI;) is called theoretical (rust for a repenting user..-
Definition 6.2.2: Assume a trust production rule with
parameter assignment P converges for a repenting user.
Given 0<&<1, the O-Tra/lsitioll phase is defined as:
mill{+l 2 1I0alld II;~E( Tk ) - E( Tn ) I< oJ -"0
where no is the turning point.
o-Transition phase is the minimum interaction number
nl greater than the rurning point such that the difference
between the theoretical trust and expected trust value at nl
is smaller than o. It characterises how fast a production
rule converges.
Lemma 6.2./: EWI rule converges for a repenting user
with means of mlow and mhigh and turning point Ilu. The




nor nlh/ilh -nt/"w )1
mw:( 0 -lIo,Oj
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I lim E(TJ; J-E(T" JI "o(m"igh-m/ow) <0
•_ n
[
"O( 1IIhi h - 1Il,ow )1
:.0-Transition phase is max( go -110 ,0)
Lemma 6.2.2: DWT converges for a repenting user with
means of ffihish and ffilow and turning point no for any
dilution factor between 0 and 1. The ideal trust value is
ffihigh_ &-Transition phase of dilute-with-lime is
r
a"o+'" 1max( loga( ) -110,0)
WlIhigh - (a"o _a"o-I + l)m/ow
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no+k- I +ak - I (l-a"o-I »m/ow +(l_a
k )mhigh
lim E{Tk ) =0 mhighh_
m . (a"o _a no- J +I)m
I lim E{Tk)-E(Tn)I=oan(~- low)
k-H.... an" an"+1
:. 5-Transition phase is
mox<rIOga{ a"o+lO' )1-no ,0)
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6.3 Cheater
Converge and o.Trallsitioll phase is defined for cheater in
the similar way as those for repenting user. We can prove
the following lemma as we do in section 6.2
Lemma 6.3./: EWI rule converges for a cheater with
means of mhigh and mlow and turning point to. The





Lemma 6.3.2: DWT rule converges for a cheater with
means of mhigh and mlow and turning point to for any
dilution factor between a and 1. The ideal lrust value is
mJow' B-Transition phase of DWT is
r
a"o"" 1max( 10ga { J ) -no,O)
{anO _a"o + 1)1Ilhigl, -ami"'"
The analytical study shows that EWI and DWT rules
converge for stable user, repenting user, and cheater. For
the last two user models, DWT (whose 5-Transition phase
is O{ loga 8» converges faster than EWI (whose &-
Transition phase is 0(1/5)) does.
The smart cheater user model, STQD and STQD-S
production rules are too complicated to theoretically
analyze. Their characteristics are studied via simulations
in the next section.
7. Experimental study
Four sets of experiments are conducted to investigate how
the rules proposed in section 3 perform for the four user
models. The rules are implemented by using update
algorithms.
The parameters for each rule are determined as
follows.
• There is no parameter for EWI algorithm.
• DWT algorithm has one parameter: dilute factor that
is 0.9. Hence, 90% of the current trust value comes from
the previous trust value and 10% from the rating of the
currenl interaction.
• Two parameters are used for STQD algorithm:
conslruction factor and destruction factor, which are 0.05
and 0.1 respectively. The functionality of these
parameters are discussed in section 4.
• The parameters used for STQD-S are shown in table
2. W~ and Wd represent the initial construction and
destruction factors respectively. PI> P2 and P3 are penalty
ratios for construction factor, destruction factor, and
supervision-period. The threshold of foul event is 0.18.
The meanings of these parameters are introduced in
section 4.
h W"",,~ f--~w,,!-,- -~p'!c'-I p, 1 p, I--;;-,Y~
0.05 0.1 0.9 0.1 .::.2__ 0.18
Table 2 Paramelers used In STQD.S algorithm
The results of the experiments are illustrated in figure
8 - 13. The x-axis of each figure is the sequence of
interactions. The y-axis represents the evaluated trust
value.
7.1 Experiments on stable users
This set of experiments is to investigate whether the rules
produce stable lrust values for stable users. SOD















9. Table 4 shows the statistical results of the evaluated
trust values. The values vary little for all algorithms as in
the previous case. The trust values produced by the first
three algorithms are still close to 0.2, the mean of ratings
of interactions. STQD-S gives much lower values (about




Figure 10 Results for a repenting user
Table 4 Simulalion resuIts for a sl.Bbly bad user
Since the possibility for the "stably bad" user to
conduct foul evenrs is high, he is under supervision at
most of the time. The construction nnd destruction factors
become close to 0 nnd 1 respectively because of the
punishment for foul events. Deconstruct events are the
dominant interactions used for trust evaluation. Thus, the
trust values nre close to the minimum rating of
interactions that is 0.1.
7.2 Experimenls on repenting user
These experiments are carried out to study how the
production rules respond to the change of a user's
behaviours. 500 interactions are generated for a repenting
user. The following equation defines her behaviours,





Figure 10 shows the resulrs for the first 150
interactions. The trust values of the first 50 interactions
are like those of the "stably bad" user studied earlier. We
are interested in how the algorithms respond to the sudden
change of user behaviours. After the mean function fm(n)
changes from 0.2 to 0.8, trust values produced by all
algorithms start to increase until they become stable
around 0.8. The trust value evaluated by DWT increases
fastest. It is 0.2015 at the 50th interaction. It rises to





















Stably good Ilser: The behaviours of the "stably good"
user is shown in figure 4. Figure 8 demonslrates the
results of applying the four algorilltms to the user. The
mean and variance of lite evaluated trust values are shown
in table 3. For a "stably good" user, all algorithms make
the similar judgemenrs (i.e., the mean of the trust values is
close to lite mean of the ratings of interactions). STQD-S
and STQD algorithms have the same results because they
are the same if no foul event occurs. The possibility of
conducting a foul event for a "stably good" user with
mean = 0.8 and variance = 0.51 is close to O.
EWI DWT STQD
0.'
"stably bad" user respectively. For the "stably good" user,
fm(t) = 0.8. For "stably bad" user, fm(l) = 0.2.
0.'




Table 3 Simulation results for a stably good user
Stably bad user: The results of applying the
algorithms to the "stably bad" user are illustrated in figure
9
that the smart cheater's effort to cover misbehaviours with
good behaviours has less and less effect with the number
of misbehaviours. The larger the number is, the faster the
effect decreases. As shown in figure 13, after about 400
interactions (20 repetitions of the behaviour pattern), the
trust value becomes stable at about 0.1 (i.e., the smart
cheater is caught). The process may be speeded up by
adjusting the parameters Pit P2and P3.
8. Conclusion
Trust production is significant for a computational trust
model. We propose four trust production rules, equal-
weight-interaction (EWI), dilute-with-time (DWT), slow-
trust-quick-distrust (STQD), and slow-trust-quick-
distrust-with-supervision (STQD·S) to automate this
process. They partially or completely salisfy the time-
dependent, interaction-dependent, trustee-dependent, and
subjectivilY properties. Four typical user behaviour
models, stable user, repenting user, cheater, and smart
cheater are developed. Analytical study shows that EWI
and DWT converge for the first three user behaviour
models, with DWT having a shorter transition phase. A
series of experiments are conducted to investigate the
performance of the trust production rules in terms of
stable results, converging speed, and capability of
catching a smarter cheater. The results indicate: (1) All
rules make the same judgments for a stably good user. For
a Slably bad user, the trust value produced by STQD-S is
lower than those produced by other rules. (2) EWI is the
slowest one lo respond to sharp change of user behaviors.
(3) STQD and DWT have the similar results for all user
models. (4) Only STQD-S can catch a smart cheater.
Trust production based on interaction sequences is the
first step in the development of a computational trust
model. We are designing algorithms that generale and
interpret recommendations to propagate trust information
among trusters. The next task is to investigate user
behavior prediction and trust-related decision making
based upon direct or indirect information. The smart
cheater model is being extended to characterize more
sophisticated user behaviors, which is of benefit to both
trust modeling and fraud detection. Our ultimate objective
is to establish an application-independent trust computing
framework that will serve as a solid foundation to advance
the security research in database and distributed systems.
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